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Abstract
Background Public emergency departments (EDs) in Sin-
gapore were facing increasing attendances (visits) with
frequent overcrowding in the 10 years from 1975 to 1985.
Over the next 12 years a series of social interventions were
carried out to minimize “unnecessary” attendances at these
EDs.
Aims This paper reviews the various interventions carried out
on ED utilization to determine their impact and usefulness.
Methods Emergency and non-emergency attendances at the
six main public EDs were analysed over the 32 years of the
reviewandespeciallyjustbeforeandsoonaftertheapplication
of four major interventions relating to use of EDs, including:
(1)publiceducationcampaigns,(2)financialdisincentives,(3)
redirection to primary health care centres and (4) use of
alternative clinics.
Results The 12-year period of social interventions resulted
in a fall in the proportion of non-emergency patients using
the EDs from 57% to 18%. Public education campaigns
each resulted in a fall in inappropriate attendances of 27%
to 67%. Financial disincentives were able to demonstrate an
impact if they were significant and resulted in a heavier
fiscal cost to the patient than if available primary health
clinics were used. Redirection of non-emergencies away
from EDs resulted in significant public relations issues with
only mild decreases in non-emergency attendances. Alter-
native clinics may provide some respite if actively
promoted by ED staff, but are able to generate their own
separate patient clientele.
Conclusions Public education and financial measures that
seek to change the pattern of ED utilization in a
community must go hand in hand with an easily
accessible primary health care system for best effect. Co-
ordination of such efforts requires active support from all
levels of the health service and political leadership. An
active feedback loop is needed for better outcomes
management.
Keywords Emergencydepartmentutilization.Publichealth
education.Financial disincentives.Inappropriate.
Redirection.Primaryhealthclinics
Introduction
Emergency departments (EDs), by their very name,
conjure impressions of high acuity, intense action and
fast pace of patient care. Most persons would presume
that such units are meant for the management of the
acutely sick and injured [1]. Worldwide, most such
departments are generally known to be open to members
of the public 24 h a day. EDs also generally have the
potential availability of access to all the resources of the
parent hospital at their disposal, such as radiological
services and other investigative modalities, in addition to
an almost unlimited array of pharmaceuticals. For most
communities, there is hardly any other more easily
accessible facility.
General practitioner (GP) clinics and community prima-
ry health care centres, on the other hand, tend to be open for
only specific hours, usually ranging from 6 to 12 h a day,
and often are hardly available on weekends and public
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health clinics would be by appointment only, and as is
present in all appointment-only systems of medical practice,
waiting times are inevitable, often in terms of days. It is,
therefore, hardly surprising that large numbers of the public
tend to use EDs for a whole variety of common medical
ailments.
From a hospital and health services perspective,
emergency patients arriving in hospitals should be cared
for in a timely manner. Unfortunately, the presence of
large numbers of relatively non-emergency patients in
EDs is a distraction. Being fully alert and able to verbally
demand the attention of medical and nursing staff, they
compete for the limited resources of such departments.
This leads to delayed action and less time to attend to the
very sick and injured, compromising the care given to
them [2, 3].
In an attempt to ensure that the EDs of the large
public hospitals in Singapore are able to handle
emergency patients without hindrance, the Ministry of
Health of this country had, since 1985, attempted a
variety of measures, including public health education
campaigns to educate community citizens on the correct
use of such units, redirecting non-emergency patients
away from these departments, setting up separate
facilities for such non-emergencies and even implement-
ing a system of financial disincentives for unwarranted
use of EDs.
The objective of this paper is to review the effects of
these various social interventions on ED utilization with a
view to determine those measures that have the greatest
potential for success.
Methods
This is a retrospective study conducted on the effects of
such social interventions since the first major intervention
in 1985. The combined emergency and non-emergency
[4] attendance statistics of the EDs of the six public general
hospitals in Singapore were reviewed for a 12-year period
from 1 November 1985 until 31 October 1997. In the latter
half of 1997, the state opened a large children’s hospital
with its own paediatric ED and also closed one of the large
hospitals and moved this to another location approximately
15 km away. These would potentially have a major impact
on the emergency department seeking characteristics of
populations in the areas of the country affected by the
shifts, especially in the immediate period. The review was,
therefore, confined to the period mentioned above, though
statistics of the last few years are introduced for the readers’
information only to better appreciate the continued effect of
earlier interventions.
The attendances of the private emergency departments in
Singapore were not included in this review for the
following reasons:
(a) Policies applied to public hospitals in Singapore over
the period 1976–2007 have not included the private
sector.
(b) There are no clear attendance statistics on ED attend-
ances in the private sector in this country to date.
However, it is generally believed that more than 90%
of ED attendances in this country occur in public
sector hospitals.
The review included all the social interventions made to
the ED utilization system during the period under review.
Such social interventions were carried out during a 12-year
period from 1985 to 1997. These interventions were as
follows:
(a) Public education campaigns on the proper use of EDs
Three major public education campaigns on the proper
use of EDs were conducted during the period reviewed.
These campaigns were:
1. November 1985 to February 1986. This consisted of
the following:
(i) Clear definitions of what constituted an emergen-
cy/non-emergency with long explanatory lists and
examples were provided to the public over the
print and broadcast media in all four official
languages of the country repeatedly almost daily
during the 4-month campaign period.
(ii) The results of public surveys on why people used
EDs for common, non-emergency ailments were
publicized to increase awareness of reasons for
what was perceived as inappropriate use of such
departments.
(iii) Lists of government polyclinics, regional general
practice clinics and available private sector 24-
h clinics were made available to the media and also
displayed at all emergency departments and the 16
government polyclinics located around the island.
(iv) Regular messages in the media, during campaign
talks and media bytes encouraging members of the
communitytohavetheir ownfamilyphysiciansand
use them as often as possible were broadcasted.
(v) Large numbers of educational pamphlets on the
proper use of emergency departments were pro-
duced and distributed to clinics, EDs and general
offices and even residential homes.
(vi) Large lighted poster boards were installed in EDs.
These displayed prominently educational messages
on the proper use of EDs and definitions and
examples of emergencies and non-emergencies.
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campaign highlighted the following:
(i) Reinforcing the messages of the 1985 campaign
especially on the consequences of misuse of EDs,
such as prolonged waiting times and adverse
impact on the severely sick and injured.
(ii) Moving to the community to get the message
across even better, such as organizing talks to
junior college students, large employer organiza-
tions, including multinational corporations.
3. One month long effort in February 1993 which
included work done in the following areas:
(i) Reinforcing the consequences of misusing EDs to
the public.
(ii) Production of pamphlets on how the public could
deal with the ten most common non-emergency
ailments encountered at EDs, namely fevers, cough,
colds, diarrhoeal illnesses, minor injuries, head-
aches, rashes, nose bleeds and chronic backaches.
(iii) Campaign promotion messages printed on letters
handled by the nation’s postal services.
(iv) Poster exhibitions and talks at community centres,
workplaces and schools.
(v) Emphasizing the importance of having a family
physician as the primary care giver.
(b) Financial disincentives directed at patients attending
EDs
Four instances of financial adjustments to the fees paid at
EDs were made during the 12-year review period in an
attempt to discourage non-emergency attendances. These
were at:
1. April 1987—when an increase in the overall ED fees
from Singapore $4 to Singapore $8 was implemented.
This was by implementing a separate Singapore $4
charge for services provided at EDs such as inves-
tigations, procedures and medications.
2. September 1989—a separate Singapore $3 increase in
the attendance fee resulted in a net fee of Singapore $15
for an ED attendance. Fees for investigations, proce-
dures and medications remained unchanged.
3. June to December 1992—when the attendance fee for
emergency patients was increased to Singapore $28 and
a differential fee for non-emergencies at Singapore $32
was introduced. In addition, itemized charging was
introduced for services performed, but capped at
Singapore $25 for investigations and procedures and
Singapore $4 for prescriptions. This resulted in an
average net fee of about Singapore $57 per attendance.
The average fee charged for a primary care visit in
Singapore at that time generally ranged from Singapore
$15 to $20 at GP clinics and was Singapore $7 at
government polyclinics.
4. October 1997—a single standard fee of Singapore $70
was introduced per ED attendance.
For all these changes, publicity on fee increases was
conducted in the print and broadcast media during the week
prior to each of the change implementation dates.
(c) Redirection of non-emergency patients from public
EDs
Redirection refers to a system of requesting patients
arriving at EDs to go to alternate health facilities outside of
the hospital for their problems to be attended to. The
redirection of patients from the front door of EDs after
initial triage to other primary care facilities such as
government polyclinics and general practitioner clinics
was implemented from 1 November 1985 to 31 October
1988. Such redirection was enforced from 0800 hours to
1700 hours on weekdays and Saturdays. No redirection was
carried out on Sundays and public holidays, when such
primary care facilities were closed.
(d) Provision of alternative clinics for re-directed patients
and those with minor complaints
Two types of alternative clinics were tried:
1. Evening clinics: these were set up at all public hospitals
from November 1985 till October 1988 at locations
fairly close to but not within the EDs. These operated
from 1700 hours to 2300 hours on weekdays when
many polyclinics and some general practitioner clinics
would be expected to be closed. The evening clinics
would be manned by doctors and nurses borrowed from
the various EDs. Patients would be redirected from the
EDs if they were triaged by trained nurses as non-
emergencies. At these evening clinics mandatory
waiting times of up to 60 min were enforced to
discourage non-urgent patients from coming to public
hospitals in the first place.
2. Walk-in clinics: from August 1995, the two largest
public hospitals in the country (Singapore General
Hospital and the Tan Tock Seng Hospital) set up walk-
in clinics operating from 0800 hours to 2300 hours
located within the hospital campus, but some distance
from the respective EDs. These clinics were intention-
ally priced at rates lower than at the EDs so as to
provide an incentive for non-emergencies to present at
the clinics rather than the EDs. The clinics were also
tasked to provide speedier service than was then
available at the EDs. However, they were priced at
rates higher than would be chargeable at private general
practitioner clinics. Patients seen there were either those
redirected from EDs or those who would have walked
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trative control of EDs, they were staffed by separate
teams of doctors and nurses.
For each initiative, the average monthly emergency and
non-emergency attendances were calculated for the
3 months immediately before and after the intervention.
In addition, the attendance statistics from as far back as
1976 and up until 2006 have been documented to
demonstrate trends in ED attendances over the years.
Results
(a) Overall ED attendances 1975–2006
During the 22-year period 1975–2006 public EDs in
Singapore saw a total of 15,144,696 patients of whom
6,379,728 were seen during the 12-year review period
1985–1997. The annual attendance figures with numbers of
emergency and non-emergency patients are given in
Table 1. Figure 1 demonstrates the trends for overall
attendances and for emergencies and non-emergencies.
Non-emergency attendances peaked during the years
1982–1984, during which time they constituted 49.4–
57.0% of all ED attendances. During the period 1975–
1984, the following changes had occurred in the pattern of
ED attendances at public hospitals:
1. The numbers of emergencies had increased over the
10 years from 1975 to 1984 inclusive by 56.6%,
constituting an average annual growth rate of 5.5%.
2. Non-emergencies, on the other hand, increased by
211.6% during this period, an annual growth rate of
14.1%.
3. The net growth in patient attendance during this period
was 218.6%
Table 1 Public emergency department average monthly attendances
in Singapore, 1975–2006
Year Average monthly attendance Emergencies Non-emergencies
1975 17,895 10,735 7,160
1976 20,073 10,792 9,281
1977 23,571 11,302 12,269
1978 24,840 14,167 10,673
1979 27,012 15,125 11,887
1980 31,035 16,652 14,383
1981 33,611 17,242 16,369
1982 36,644 17,000 19,644
1983 38,235 19,366 18,869
1984 39,127 16,816 22.311
1985 36,526 20,275 16,251
1986 31,512 24,845 6,667
1987 36,388 26,248 10,140
1988 40,480 26,749 13,731
1989 42,869 26,554 16,315
1990 44,464 26,801 17,663
1991 43,075 26,276 16,799
1992 43,091 28,009 15,062
1993 39,928 27,151 12,777
1994 39,172 29,575 9,597
1995 43,649 34,166 9,483
1996 44,892 37,709 7,183
1997 45,598 37,310 8,288
1998 43,235 35,644 7,591
1999 44,410 38,322 6,088
2000 44,779 39,577 5,202
2001 47,382 43,935 3,447
2002 49,749 49,016 713
2003 46,019 45,589 430
2004 51,541 51,318 223
2005 54,859 54,615 244
2006 56,397 56,271 126
0
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Fig. 1 Monthly average attend-
ances at public emergency
departments, Singapore (1975–
2006)
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described in more detail), during the period 1985–1992, the
proportion of non-emergencies fell to 32.0% in 1993 and
has been steadily falling ever since. During this period of
active interventions, the average annual growth rate for
emergencies was 5.8%, very similar to the pre-intervention
period, while non-emergencies declined by 42.0%. During
this 9-year time period, overall patient attendance only
grew marginally by 2.1%.
In the immediate post-intervention 4-year period, overall
patient attendances grew by 14.3%. Most of these were
accounted for by an average annual growth in emergency
attendances of 8.5%. These 4 years also saw a further fall in
the non-emergency attendances at public EDs by 55.1%.
In 1997, 12 years after the start of the interventions to be
discussed in further detail, non-emergencies constituted
18.0% of all ED attendances.
Since then, these numbers have continued to fall, in
spite of the increasing pattern of emergency attendances
at public EDs in the country. Emergency attendances at
public EDs have increased at an average rate of 4.9% per
annum over the last 10 years. Overall the total attendance
at public EDs has increased by about 23.6% over the last
10 years.
(b) Impact of public education campaigns (Table 2)
All three campaigns (Table 2) produced substantial
reductions in overall ED attendances. Yet, some time after
the intensity of the campaigns had subsided, the numbers of
patients had gradually increased. The factors contributing to
such an increase could not be determined in this review.
The data demonstrated the following:
1. Average non-emergency attendances after each public
education campaign decreased by a factor of 67.3% to
27.2%. Though it appears that the proportion of fall
was less with each succeeding campaign, this cannot be
taken to imply that the public was becoming immune to
campaigns, as the duration of the subsequent efforts
was significantly shorter than the first (2 weeks and
1 month vs 3 months)
2. Except for the first campaign which saw an increase in
emergency numbers, the other two were associated with
a fall in total numbers of emergencies, though the
magnitude of the fall was less than for non-emergen-
cies. Though figures are not available for all public
hospitals, the figures of the largest centre (Singapore
General Hospital) revealed that while non-emergencies
there decreased by 34.4% for the second campaign and
27.9% for the third campaign, the numbers of priority 1
emergencies (resuscitations) increased by 1.2% and
1.4%, respectively, for the second and third campaigns,
and 0.7% and 3.1%, respectively, for priority 2 (non-
resuscitation, but critical) patients. For minor ambulant
priority 3 patients, however, attendances fell by 27.5%
during the second campaign and 25.1% for the third.
These two campaigns were associated with greater
emphasis on the role of the family physician and on
management of common ailments, some of which were
grouped as priority 3.
3. The figures also demonstrate how the numbers of non-
emergencies gradually reverted to the pre-campaign
levels many months after the end of the campaigns. The
reasons for this reversion to pre-campaign levels could
not be ascertained from the data.
4. During the 8 years of the public education campaigns,
the net annual growth of emergency attendances
remained similar at 5.8% (5.5% annual growth before
the 1985 period). However, total patient attendances at
public EDs grew only by 2.1% over the period, the
minimal increase in total attendances being due
primarily to a steep fall in non-emergency and some
minor emergency attendances. This contrasted sharply
with an average annual increase in annual attendance
Table 2 Impact of public education on public ED attendances in Singapore, 1985–1997
Period of public
education campaign
Monitoring periods Average monthly
attendances
Average monthly
emergency attendances
Average monthly non-
emergency attendances
Nov 1985 to Feb 1986 Before campaign (10 months
from Jan to Oct 1985)
36,014 19,267 16,747
After campaign (10 months from
Mar to Dec 1986)
28,836 23,357 5,479
% Change −19.9% +21.2% −67.3%
Sep 1991 Before campaign (Jun to Aug 1991) 45,176 26,859 18,317
After campaign (Oct to Dec 1991) 34,749 23,185 11,564
% Change −23.1% −13.7% −36.9%
Feb 1993 Before campaign (Nov 1992 to Jan 1993) 47,512 28,527 18,985
After campaign (Mar to May 1993) 39,506 25,679 13,827
% Change −16.9% −10.0% −27.2%
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significantly by marked annual increases in non-
emergency attendances.
(c) Impact of financial disincentives (Table 3)
1. The initial fee increases implemented in April 1987
and September 1989 had, by themselves, no impact
on ED attendances.
2. Financial measures began to have an effect on
attendances only after ED fees exceeded the
charges levied by the nation’s primary health care
services, as in 1992 and 1997. Especially in 1992,
the fall in non-emergency attendances far exceeded
the increase in emergencies. The gradual fall in
non-emergency attendances continued over the
years between 1992 and 1997 and the further fall
after the fee increase would be most likely owing
to the continuing decrease in non-emergency
attendances that had been occurring for some
years.
3. The fall in emergency attendances, however, was
predominantly an effect of the minor emergencies
(priority 3 patients). Though figures on such
patients managed by the primary health care
services are not available, the general impression
then was that more such patients were beginning to
look towards their primary health care doctor for
minor emergencies.
(d) Impact of redirection of non-emergencies (Table 4)
1. The numbers of non-emergencies redirected from
ED triage rooms to primary health care centres was
highest in the first 2 months of the effort.
Gradually, the numbers of patients who were
redirected to primary health care centres decreased.
2. The efforts at redirection of patients from the EDs
met with a fair amount of resistance from members
of the public. There were frequent instances of such
redirected members creating scenes just outside the
EDs and sometimes resorting to verbal abuse and
threats to triage staff. Patients frequently insisted on
being seen at the EDs because they were already
there. Frequently ED doctors had to be called out to
triage stations to arbitrate over disputes that
occurred during the redirection process.
3. With all these the numbers of patients triage
nurses were able to redirect after triaging them as
non-emergencies constituted only between 7.9%
and 17.6% of all such patients presenting to the
EDs.
4. With the decreasingredirectionsover the3years, the
frequent adverse public relations incidents at the
front doors of the various EDs and the decreasing
contribution of such redirections to non-emergency
attendances at hospitals, this scheme was discon-
tinued after completion of its third year.
Table 3 Impact of financial disincentives on public ED attendances in Singapore, 1985–1997
Period of financial disincentive Monitoring periods Average monthly
attendances
Average monthly
emergency attendances
Average monthly non-
emergency attendances
1 April 1987 (fee increased
from Singapore $8 to $2)
Before increase
(Jan to Mar 1987)
28,836 23,357 5,479
After increase (Apr
to May 1987)
31,365 25,092 6,273
% Change +8.8% +7.4% +14.5%
1 September 1989 (fee increased
from Singapore $2 to $5)
Before increase
(Jun to Aug 1989)
40,255 26,568 13,687
After increase
(Sep to Nov 1989)
40,982 27,458 13,524
% Change +1.8% +3.3% −1.2%
June to December 1992 (attendance
fee increased from Singapore $5 to $28
for emergencies and $32 for non-emergencies).
Additional itemized fees for services
up to $5) and prescription (up to $4)
Before increase
(1991)
43,075 26,276 16,799
After increase
(1993)
39,928 27,151 12,772
% Change −7.3% +3.3% −23.9%
1 October 1997 (single fee of Singapore $70) Before increase
(Jul to Sep 1997)
45,740 37,460 8,280
After increase (Oct
to Dec 1997)
40,325 32,759 7,566
% Change −11.8% −12.5% −8.6%
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single documented instance of any patient suffering
adverse medical consequences as a result of not
being treated at the ED and instead being routed to
a primary care clinic.
(e) Impact of alternative clinics (Table 5)
1. These clinics were also not very popular with
patients classified as non-emergencies after initial
triage at the EDs. They contributed another
decrease of 9.8% to 20.8% to the decrease in non-
emergency attendances at the various public EDs.
2. For each patient routed to an evening clinic, time was
consumed by staff having to provide detailed
instructions on how to walk to the evening clinics,
provide the appropriate directional pamphlets and
also a note to the effect that they have been so routed.
3. With a combination of both procedures, that is
routingtoaneveningclinicandredirectingtoanout-
of-hospital primary health care clinic, the impact on
non-emergencies who could be finally turned away
from the ED decreased from a promising 39.3% in
the first year to a dismal 17.7% in the third year of
operation. The inability to sustain substantial benefit
from this exercise and the generally low workload
led to the closing of the evening clinics in late 1988.
These clinics were also drawing upon the resources
of their parent EDs (doctors and nurses). That such
resources could be better utilized to manage the
existing non-emergencies within the EDs also
contributed to the final decision to terminate the
rerouting and redirection exercise.
4. Some years later, in the last quarter of 1995, the
setting up of independent walk-in clinics offering
speedier service has not appeared to have made any
significant impact on ED non-emergency attend-
ances. Instead the walk-in clinics attracted their own
clientele,asseenbytheincreasing attendances there.
5. Such walk-in clinics were also generally seen as
competing with private GPs even though they were
priced higher. Patients frequenting these clinics
often saw the back-up resources within a major
hospital as a major convenience that could not be
matched by stand-alone primary care clinics.
Discussion
The whole saga of using social interventions to limit
perceived inappropriate use of emergency departments begs
the question whether there is any need at all to control the
case mix of EDs in a community.
In today’s world of increasing health care costs, insurers
of health care often see non-urgent care as one that can be
low-cost, if provided in a low-cost facility, owing to less
Table 4 Impact of redirection of non-emergencies on public ED attendances in Singapore (redirection carried out from November 1985 to
October 1988)
Period of
monitoring
Average monthly
emergency attendances
Average monthly non-
emergency attendances
Numbers redirected
per month
% Contribution to decrease in
non-emergency attendance
1984 16,816 22,311 NA NA
1985 (Jan to Oct) 19,267 16,747 NA NA
1985 (Nov to Dec) 17,953 11,003 1,685 13.3%
1986 24,845 6,667 1,512 17.6%
1987 26,248 10,140 1,329 11.6%
1988 (Jan to Oct) 27,932 12,548 1,088 7.9%
Table 5 Impact of alternative clinics on public ED attendances in Singapore, 1985–1997
Type of alternative
clinic
Monitoring
periods
Average monthly
non-emergency attendances
Alternative clinic attendances Percentage non-emergency
savings at ED
Evening clinic 1986 6,667 1,752 20.8%
1987 10,140 1,342 11.7%
1988 12,548 1,361 9.8%
Evening clinic + redirections 1986 6,667 3,264 39.3%
1987 10,140 2,671 23.3%
1988 12,548 2,449 17.7%
Walk-in clinic Last quarter 1995 2,285 3,764 NA
1996 1,877 4,738 NA
1997 2,287 5,769 NA
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often form a significant portion of the fixed cost of health
care establishments [5–7]. Such payers of the health care
dollar would tend to view more favourably care being
provided in low-resource environments such as primary
health care units. In socialized medicine communities [8],
governments would think along similar lines, as the health
care dollar is precious, politically a hot topic and allows
better use of scarce funds. Modern EDs are increasingly
being staffed by highly trained specialists and use progres-
sively higher-technology equipment that all contribute to an
increasing fixed cost of facility care.
ED leaders and managers have two major conflicting
perspectives on this. Those with low high-acuity workloads,
fearing closure and wanting to survive would welcome
managing a larger proportion of non-emergency and minor
emergency patients owing to the ease of care for these, a
generally shorter time to manage most such patients, and
potentially substantial financial reimbursement that will help
to make their business units fiscally viable [5, 9]. Those with
crowded EDs needing to handle constant complaints of
waiting times and the like with little incentive to see more
patients would wish such non-urgent attendees would not
come to them, so that their limited resources can be better
managed for what they perceive as their raison d’être.
Rather than being judgemental on this issue, this paper
attempts to address the need of communities that hope to
maximize care potential with their limited resources and
ensure that waiting times are significantly shortened to the
general satisfaction of their stakeholders [10]. Patients have
a different perspective and perception of urgency. The issue
of emergency department crowding in Singapore, as in
most communities, has to do with concerns on standards of
care and optimizing allocation of limited resources. When
emergency department overcrowding became a source of
irritation to the health authorities because of frequent
complaints and airing of concerns in the local media, the
Health Services took a long-term perspective and began to
consider multiple approaches that will provide the basis for
solutions that would be acceptable to the community.
Taking this approach meant that the civil authority needed
to provide some form of overarching oversight of the
“problem” as it was perceived [11], hospital boards needed
to provide the support to their emergency departments to
make solutions work, and emergency medicine leaders had
to operationalize the solutions, monitor their impact and
follow through on agreed actions. Fortunately, there was
ample room for feedback and adjustments and comfort
margins of front-line emergency departments were given
due consideration. Such a community approach to the
problem helped in the realization of some of the benefits
that accrued from this long-term collaboration within the
public health care services of the country.
Internationally, there is a lack of validated standards to
guide health services in measuring the appropriateness of
emergency department visits [1, 12, 13]. We have used the
Patient Acuity Categorization Scale (PACS) drawn up and
periodically revised by the Emergency Medicine Services
Committee, Singapore [14] as a guide for emergency
departments to make decisions on acuity and disposition.
Singapore uses a four-category system with the first three
referring to a range of emergency acuities (priority 1 for
resuscitative care, priority 2 for rapid care, priority 3 for
urgent care in an ambulatory setting), and the fourth
category referring to non-urgent care. Throughout the
whole of the review period, the basic definitions differen-
tiating the emergency categorizations from the non-urgent
categorization remained unchanged. These categorizations
were formulated and disseminated via the members of the
Emergency Medicine Services Committee, who were all
Heads of their various public hospital EDs. Occasional
random audits of the practice of these categorizations were
also conducted to ensure that consistency variations did not
exceed 5%. Where such variations were encountered, the
proportions established during the audit sessions were
applied for the period of review. The Emergency Medicine
Services Committee also provided the mechanism for
regular and frequent reminders to all public emergency
departments for consistent use of these definitions. In such
a setting, defining priority 4 patients as inappropriate ED
use was acceptable and is used in this review.
This review indicates that single or short-term public
education efforts tend to have a short-term impact in
reducing apparent inappropriate ED attendances. Greater
effect was noted with repetitive public education efforts that
allowed messages to sink in. These efforts need to be
channeled through multiple media, such as radio, news-
papers, television, pamphlets, talks, messages at multiple
levels and even mass distribution of flyers and educational
pamphlets that may be distributed to residential homes.
Such an effort requires funding and support from the civil
authority and the political leadership. For success there has
to be active support from the emergency medicine
community and consistency in the messages delivered.
The availability of a committee of community emergency
medicine leaders that came together frequently to share
notes and evaluate outcomes of measures carried out in this
effort is another crucial factor. All these indicate commit-
ment of the civil, political and professional leadership in
wanting to make this happen. It is such unity that gives
strength to the campaign.
Mention needs to be made of the rebound effect with
increasing attendances when the public education messages
ceased. Such rebound effects were noted to be dampened
with repeated education campaigns, especially when fol-
lowed by education on how members of the public could
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alternative primary health clinics in the community and their
opening hours. The emphasis on the non-misuse of EDs for
the greater good was also noted to help win many friends to
the cause and blunted opposition to the campaign in general.
Financial interventions need to be significant if they are to
have any impact. Even then, financial measures to discour-
age inappropriate use of EDs need to provide enough fiscal
discomfort to those with minor ailments. There is always
concern that financial disincentives may also deter the less
well off in society with critical illnesses from seeking early
medical help. This concern has to be addressed in the
publicity on these measures. The rationale for the fee
increasesmust be clearly explained to anincreasinglyliterate
populace, if such moves are to gather general acceptance
from the community. The concept of individual responsibil-
ity in minimizing risk of injury and illness also needs to be
emphasized for members of the public to more easily accept
the financial disincentives as a “penalty” for previous slack
in measures to stay healthy. However, the message that no
patient will be denied care on account of being unable to pay
must be strong as a form of public safety assurance.
Our experience has been that redirection of non-emer-
gencies can be an exercise fraught with potential public
relations issues. There was always potential for legal action
from an aggrieved member of the public who had been
redirected. Therefore, the guidelines on redirection were
carefully considered and discussed before implementation.
Pre-redirection publicity was carried out and back-up
intervention by senior ED doctors on duty was agreed to
each time a dispute arose. As a result there were no cases of
legal action taken against any ED during the period of
redirection or thereafter for the redirection carried out. There
is a common general impression that Singapore is a far less
litigious country than some others, such as the USA, and
especially so in the 1980s. The willingness of patients
arriving at EDs to willingly move to alternate clinics is
usually low. In addition, communities wishing to implement
redirection to alternative clinics would need to ensure that
such alternative sites are easily accessible with minimal
waiting,atleast from apublicsafetyperspective.Unless staff
of EDs have the time and resources to discuss preferences for
referral out of their department in cases of inappropriate
attendances, the community would need to look at punitive
measures to discourage such inappropriate use.
The review did not look at a single intervention. This
could not have been possible since some of these
interventions were instituted within relatively short inter-
vals after others. This illustrates that overcrowding at public
emergency departments needs a multi-pronged approach
that may even go beyond the measures discussed above and
include others such as augmentation of ED resources [3]
and of the capacity of the primary health care system to
absorb the non-emergency and selected minor emergency
patients who today frequent EDs, but may not require any
form of hospitalization or prolonged observation.
The various measures that were intended to decrease
non-emergency visits to EDs also resulted in decreases of
minor emergency visits. Such visits, while usually seen as
appropriate, may also be regarded as discretionary since
other alternatives exist that allow earlier care to be
delivered for an emerging condition and potentially prevent
the need to visit an ED.
ED overcrowding is an international problem. In a
number of communities, ED overcrowding has reportedly
reached crisis proportions [15–17]. Though there are
various causes of overcrowding, patient arrivals have been
one aspect [17] that has been looked at in different
communities. Since EDs have a crucial role in the public
health status of the population, threats to their ability to
ensure quality emergency care can be seen as contributing
to this crisis [18]. While non-urgent patients may not be the
main cause of ED overcrowding in certain countries [19–
21], other communities which have limited medical and
nursing manpower resources and that are held accountable
for waiting times, commit significant resources to attend to
the relatively non-urgent group of patients presenting to an
emergency department [22].
Limitations
For many years there was no requirement for documenta-
tion of the emergency-type categorization of the patient. All
that was required during the first 22 of the 32 years covered
by this review was that every attendance had to be
categorized as either emergency or non-emergency. Docu-
mentation of the patient into one of the three categories of
emergency (priority 1, 2 and 3) was an option and not
implemented in all the EDs of the local public hospital
system. The data on the numbers of priority 3 patients who
presented to the health service is thus incomplete and could
not be presented fully in this paper.
This, being a retrospective review of the service over a
32-year period, is heavily dependent on the accuracy of the
available records. A critical assumption made in this review
is that the basic definition of emergency and non-
emergency for all patients presenting to the various
emergency departments in the public health service was
followed. Separate verification of the accuracy of these
designations for the individual patients could not be made
especially during the first 10 years of the period of review.
For the period of the social interventions from 1985 to
1997, there is no documented feedback of patients
redirected from EDs having suffered adverse medical
consequences. There are no statistics available to indicate
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EDs, either on the day of redirection or the few days
thereafter, for the same medical complaint. Neither were
records kept of the actual individual instances when
disputes arose between members of the public and ED
triage staff during the redirection process. As a result there
was no documentation of the degree of agreement or
disagreement between doctors and nurses whenever such
disputes arose.
This review was confined to the patients who attended
only the public health care system in Singapore. It does not
cover the patients seen in the private health care system in
the country. Since the EDs in the private sector in
Singapore are generally considered to manage less than
10% of the overall emergency workload in the country
(again this is only an estimate owing to the lack of accurate
data on ED attendances in private sector hospitals), the
unavailability of those data is not expected to significantly
alter the results of the review. At the same time, the
pressures that private sector hospitals have to bear may be
very different from those faced by those in the public
sector. Such pressures can, potentially, alter the approach
they may take on the issue of non-urgent ED attendances.
Conclusion
Public education measures and financial measures that seek
to change the pattern of ED utilization must go hand in
hand with an easily accessible primary health care system
in the community for best effect. All such efforts need to be
sustained and co-ordinated at the level of the community
with active support from all levels of the health service and
the political leadership. An active mechanism for feedback
is essential for good outcomes management of such
programmes.
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